

Message Text

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6158
INFO AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM
AMEMBASSY GABORONE
AMEMBASSY LAGOS
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY LUSAKA
AMEMBASSY MAPUTO
AMEMBASSY NAIROBI
AMEMBASSY PRETORIA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 USUN 3743

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PORG, RH, UNSC
SUBJECT: RHDESIA: TALKS AT USUN WITH PREM CHAND, OCTOBER 12

1. BEGIN SUMMARY: PREM CHAND MET OCTOBER 12 WITH AMB. YOUNG TO GAIN YOUNG'S IMPRESSIONS OF THE CURRENT STATE-OF-PLAY IN RHODESIA NEGOTIATIONS, KEY PERSONALITIES, AND POTENTIAL NEXT STEPS. HE APPEARED TOUGH, SMART AND CONFIDENT AND HE ASKED THE RIGHT QUESTIONS. END SUMMARY.

2. AMB. YOUNG OPENED THE MEETING BY DESCRIBING SOME OF THE KEY PLAYERS IN THE RHODESIA NEGOTIATIONS. HE SAID THAT THE NIGERIAN INPUT WAS VERY IMPORTANT AND THAT GNERAL OBSANJO WANTED TO WORK CLOSELY WITH THE PEACE EFFORT. TANZANIA AND MOZAMBIQUE WERE ALSO VERY COOPERATIVE BUT ZAMBIA AND BOTSWANA HAD NOT SHOWN THE SAME SPIRIT. KAUNDA AND MOGWE WERE BOTH SKEPTICAL BUT THEY WILL PROBABLY BE
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COOPERATIVE WHEN IT COUNTS. YOUNG DID NOT BELIEVE THAT KAUNDA, SMITH AND NKOMO WERE PLOTTING AN INTERNAL SOLUTION BEHIND EVERYONE ELSE'S BACK.

3. YOUNG NOTED THAT PREM CHAND'S MANDATE WILL RESTRICT HIS DISCUSSIONS TO MILITARY AND ASSOCIATED SUBJECTS-- THIS RESTRICTION WILL TEND TO CONFINE HIS DISCUSSIONS

TO THE RHODESIAN WHITES AND THE LIBERATION MOVEMENTS BUT MUZOREWA AND SITHOLE MUST BE KEPT INFORMED. ON THE OTHER HAND, KNOMO AND MUGABE WILL CERTAINLY NOT WANT TO BE CUT OUT OF ANY NON-MILITARY TALKS. NKOM WOULD PREFER TO FREEZE MUZOREWA AND SITHOLE OUT OF THE NON-MILITARY TALKS IF HE COULD.

4. YOUNG SAID THAT THE KEY TO SUCCESSFUL TALKS WOULD BE WITH SMITH'S GENERALS. THERE WAS AN AWARENESS IN THE RDF OF THE FUTILITY OF ARMED STRUGGLE. SMITH HAD ALREADY SAID THAT "ONCE I START THESE TALKS MY ARMY WILL LEAVE." YOUNG SAID THAT THE MILITARY IN RHODESIA MAY BE THE MOST LIKELY OF THE WHITES TO COME TO ITS SENSES. AGREEMENT TO SATISFACTORY MILITARY ARRANGEMENTS WAS A PREREQUISITE FOR A CEASEFIRE. SMITH WAS NOT CORNERED YET. IF REASONABLE SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS COULD BE WORKED OUT, A CEASEFIRE COULD PROVIDE A FACE-CAVING OUT FOR HIM.

5. YOUNG ASKED PREM CHAND TO LET HIM KNOW IF HE FELT SMITH WAS REFUSING COOPERATION BECAUSE THE USG WOULD THEN BE IN A POSITION TO IMPOSE ADDITIONAL SANCTIONS--EVEN AGAINST SOUTH AFRICA. YOUNG SAID THAT SOUTH AFRICA WAS NOT BEING MUCH HELP. IT WAS ONLY ENCOURAGING SMITH TO GO ALONG WITH THE NEGOTIATIONS BUT DEMANDING NO SPECIFICS FROM HIM.

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6. PREM CHAND THEN NOTED THAT IT REALLY WAS THE MILITARY COMMANDERS IN THE LIBERATION MOVEMENT WHO MUST BE PINNED DOWN AND HE ASKED WHO THESE COMMANDERS WERE. YOUNG ANSWERED THAT WE KNEW SOME OF THEIR NAMES AND HE AGREED THAT IT WAS MOST IMPORTANT TO TALK TO THEM. THERE WOULD BE LITTLE GAINED IN HAVING AN ELABORATE POLITICAL SOLUTION IF IT WERE OVERTURNED BY SOME GUERRILLA COMMANDER SIX MONTHS LATER. THERE MUST BE IN-THE-FIELD CONTACTS WITH THE GUERRILLA COMMANDERS. PERHAPS A US REPRESENTATIVE TO THE TALKS COULD DO THAT IN SOME SORT OF OBSERVER STATUS. PREM CHAND SAID THAT IT WOULD BE VERY USEFUL FOR HIM TO HAVE SOME HELP IN LOCATING AND DEALING WITH POPULAR FRONT COMMANDERS IN THE AREA.

7. PREM CHAND THEN ASKED TO WHAT EXTENT THE FRONT-LINE STATES WOULD GO ALONG WITH THE CEASEFIRE. AMBASSADOR YOUNG SAID THAT THEY WOULD GO ALONG ONE-HUNDRED PERCENT PROVIDED SMITH IS EVENTUALLY OUSTED. THERE COULD BE NO SUSTAINED VIOLENCE WITHOUT THE SUPPORT OF THE FRONT-LINE STATES. THE FRONT-LINE STATES SAY THAT THEY WILL SUPPORT THE WINNER OF ELECTIONS IN ZIMBABWE NO MATTER WHO IT

MAY BE. THE FRONT-LINE STATES WOULD LIKE TO SEE PEACE AND HARMONY IN ZIMBABWE EVEN MORE THAN THEY WOULD LIKE TO SEE A VICTORY BY THE PATRIOTIC FRONT.

8. REGARDING THE TIMING OF THE CEASEFIRE AND SMITH'S DEPARTURE, PREM CHAND WONDERED IF WE WERE NOT IN A CHICKEN-AND-EGG SITUATION. YOUNG REPLIED THAT A CEASEFIRE MUST BE OUTLINED AND AGREED TO, EVEN IF NOT ACTUALLY IMPLEMENTED, BEFORE SMITH WOULD STEP DOWN. AMB. MCHENRY SAID THAT THERE WERE TWO CRUNCH POINTS: THE FIRST WAS AGREEING ON ACCEPTABLE MILITARY ARRANGEMENTS AND THE SECOND WAS GETTING RID OF SMITH. THE TWO POINTS MUST BE APPROACHED IN SEQUENCE. WE COULD NOT EXPECT TO "BELL THE CAT" BEFORE EVENTS HAD MOVED
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US TO THAT STAGE.

9. REGARDING A TIMETABLE FOR THE PREM CHAND/CARVER TALKS, AMB. YOUNG SAID THAT HE HOPED THAT PREM CHAND AND CARVER COULD FINISH THEIR EXPLORATORY ROUNDS WITHIN THIRTY DAYS. THE SECURITY COUNCIL WOULD GET RESTLESS IN THE MEANTIME, HOWEVER, AND IT PROBABLY WOULD BE A GOOD IDEA IF SOME SORT OF PRELIMINARY VERBAL REPORT COULD BE SUBMITTED BY A MEMBER OF PREM CHAND'S STAFF BEFORE THAT TIME. BY MID-NOVEMBER YOUNG HOPED THAT PREM CHAND AND CARVER WOULD BE DISCUSSING THE FORMAT OF SERIOUS NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE PARTIES. FROM 15 NOVEMBER TO 15 DECEMBER, YOUNG HOPED THAT IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO SKETCH OUT CEASEFIRE ARRANGEMENTS, THE REQUIREMENTS FOR A UN PEACEKEEPING FORCE AND THE SHAPE OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL MANDATE AND ALSO SET A TRANSFER DATE WHICH YOUNG HOPED MIGHT BE AROUND JANUARY 20. IN THE SIX WEEKS FROM DECEMBER 15 TO JANUARY 20, YOUNG HOPED THAT THE SECURITY COUNCIL COULD AGREE ON A MANDATE AND THAT THE SECRETARY GENERAL COULD RECRUIT A UN FORCE. TOWARD THE END OF THAT PERIOD, AT LEAST PART OF THAT FORCE WOULD COME TO ZIMBABWE, THE CEASEFIRE WOULD BE ESTABLISHED, SMITH'S ARMY WOULD BEGIN TO DISBAND, AND SMITH HIMSELF WOULD COMPLETE HIS ARRANGEMENTS FOR STEPPING DOWN.

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EXDIS

10. PREM CHAND SAID THAT THE ESSENTIAL PART OF THE PROCESS WAS TRANSFER DAY WHEN A NEW RHODESIAN ARMY UNDER FIELD MARSHAL CARVER WOULD BE ESTABLISHED. HE ASKED IF THERE WAS ANY AGREEMENT YET ON THE COMPOSITION OF THE NEW ARMY AND OF THE POLICE. AMB. YOUNG SAID THAT THERE WAS AGREEMENT IN PRINCIPLE BY THE FRONT-LINE PRESIDENTS ON THE COMPOSITION OF THE NEW ZIMBABWEAN ARMY. OF COURSE DETAILS REMAINED TO BE WORKED OUT. MAYBE, FOR EXAMPLE, IN THE COURSE OF ORGANIZING A NEW ZIMBABWEA ARMY WE WOULD SIMPLY WANT TO TELL MUGABE AND NKOMA TO DELIVER A SPECIFIED NUMBER OF TROOPS TO A SPECIFIED PLACE FOR TRAINING BY THE UN FORCES. THIS PLACE MIGHT WELL BE OUTSIDE ZIMBABWE. UN UNDER SECRETARY-GENERAL URQUHART SAID HE THOUGHT IT WAS UNREALISTIC THAT THE UN COULD PUT VARIOUS GUERRILLA GROUPS TOGETHER UNDER UN AUSPICES FOR TRAINING. ALL THE GUERRILLA LEADERS OPPOSED THIS. YOUNG REPLIED THAT HE THOUGHT THESE
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LEADERS OPPOSED SUCH A PLAN BECAUSE IN REALITY THEY DIDN'T HAVE ENOUGH CONTROL OVER THEIR TROOPS TO PRODUCE A SPECIFIED NUMBER IN A SPECIFIED PLACE. THEY DID NOT WANT TO BREAK THE ILLUSION THAT THEY POSSESSED LARGE, WELL-DISCIPLINED FORCES. PERSONALLY, YOUNG THOUGHT THAT A BUNCH OF RAG-TAG INTERNAL GUERRILLAS WOULD PREFERE THE AMENITIES OF A UN

TRAINING CAMP TO WHAT THEY NOW HAVE.

1. YOUNG SUGGESTED THAT PART OF PREM CHAND'S OPERATION MUST BE AN INTELLIGENCE EXERCISE. HOW MANY PATRIOTIC FRONT TROOPS WERE THERE AND WHERE WERE THEY? OBASANJO, FOR EXAMPLE, WAS JUST RECENTLY TOLD THAT THERE WERE NONE IN MOZAMBIQUE. IF THE PATRIOTIC FRONT COULD NOT PRODUCE ORGANIZED MILITARY UNITS TO BE TRAINED BY THE UN INTO A NEW ZIMBABWEAN ARMY THEN PERHAPS IT WOULD BE BETTER TO FIND THEM IN THE MEN THAT NYERERE CLAIMED TO BE TRAINING. PREM CHAND NOTED THAT UK INTELLIGENCE SAID THAT THERE WERE NOW 30,000 GUERRILLAS OF WHICH ONLY 3,000 WERE ACTUALLY INSIDE RHODESIA. HE WOULD LIKE ASSURANCES AND HELP IN TRYING TO KEEP THE GUERRILLAS NOW OUTSIDE RHODESIA OUT. AMB. YOUNG AGREED THAT IT WOULD BE A LOT EASIER TO DEAL WITH GUERRILLA TROOPS OUTSIDE RHODESIA THAN INSIDE, ESPECIALLY IF THE FRONT-LINE STATES WOULD HELP KEEP THE "OUTSIDERS" IN CHECK. THE REAL PROBLEM IN THIS REGARD WAS TO LOCATE AND SUCCESSFULLY DEAL WITH THOSE 3,000 GUERRILLAS ALREADY INSIDE ZIMBABWE. PREM CHAND AGREED AND SAID THAT PERHAPS THE BEST INITIAL THING FOR HIM TO DO WOULD BE TO HAVE HIS FIRST CONTACTS WITH GUERRILLA LEADERS OUTSIDE ZIMBABWE AND TO GAIN SOME ASSURANCES FROM THE FRONT-LINE PRESIDENTS OF ASSISTANCE IN CONFIDENTIAL

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HELPING HIM DEAL WITH THESE OUTSIDE FORCES.

12. PREM CHAND THEN ASKED HOW YOUNG SAW HIM MESHING WITH THE UK EFFORT AND FIELD MARSHAL CARVER. YOUNG REPLIED THAT HE HOPED THAT A LOT OF PERSONAL CONFIDENCE WOULD BE DEVELOPED TOWARD FIELD MARSHAL CARVER, BUT SAID THAT THE AFRICANS WOULD NOT WANT TO RELY ON CARVER ALONE. PREM CHAND'S UN PRESENCE WOULD BE VERY IMPORTANT IN ESTABLISHING TRUST. IT WOULD, YOUNG THOUGHT, BE PARALLEL TO THE ROLE HE (YOUNG) PLAYED IN ACCOMPANYING FOREIGN SECRETARY OWEN.

13. YOUNG REITERATED THAT NKOMO WOULD TRY TO TURN THE MILITARY TALKS IN NON-MILITARY DIRECTIONS. YOUNG DID NOT THINK CARVER SHOULD GET INTO THAT. IF HE DID, THESE KEY MILITARY TALKS WOULD BE BOGGED DOWN SINCE OTHER PARTIES WOULD THEN DEMAND TO BE INVOLVED. YOUNG SAID THAT THE LIMITS IN PREM CHAND'S MANDATE MIGHT BE VERY USEFUL IN RESTRICTING TALKS BY BOTH PREM CHAND AND CARVER TO MILITARY AND ASSOCIATED SUBJECTS AT LEAST IN THE INITIAL STAGES WHEN WE DID NOT WANT THEM TO BE PREMATURELY EXPANDED. YOUNG

THOUGHT THAT IT WOULD BE UNWISE TO GET ENTANGLED IN TALKS ON CONSTITUTIONAL MATTERS UNTIL THE MILITARY TALKS WERE WELL ALONG.

14. PREM CHAND ASKED ABOUT SUPERPOWER RIVALRY IN THE RHODESIAN SITUATION. YOUNG REPLIED THAT, WHILE NO ONE WAS SAYING SO IN PUBLIC, THE US AND THE USSR WERE AGREED ON CERTAIN ELEMENTS. BOTH, FOR EXAMPLE, WOULD NOT MIND SEEING THE PATRIOTIC FRONT LEADERS IN CHARGE OF AN INDEPENDENT ZIMBABWE.

15. PREM CHAND ASKED YOUNG AT WHAT STAGE HE THOUGHT THE UN TROOPS SHOULD ARRIVE. THE DATE OF THE DISBANKING OF THE RHODESIAN ARMY, AFOR EXAMPLE, WOULD BE CONFIDENTIAL

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VERY RELEVANT TO THE TIMING OF THE ENTRANCE OF A UN FORCE. YOUNG SAID THAT ONCE THE TRANSFER DATE IS SET ELEMENTS LIKE THE SELOUS SCOUTS AND THE MERCENARIES WOULD LEAVE ZIMBABWE; THUS IT WAS IMPORTANT TO GET AT LEAST SOME UN TROOPS INTO ZIMBABWE BEFORE THE TRANSFER DATE IN ORDER TO FORESTALL THE COLLAPSE OF WHITE CONFIDENCE. EVEN ONE OR TWO PLATOONS - PERHAPS A PLATOON OR SO FROM EACH CONTRIBUTING NATION - WOULD BE VERY USEFUL. CERTAINLY THE LEADERS OF THE VARIOUS NATIONAL COMPONENTS SHOULD MEET WITH PREM CHAND AS EARLY AS POSSIBLE. THE ARRIVAL OF EVEN A TOKEN UN FORCE WOULD HAVE AN ENORMOUS PSYCHOLOGICAL EFFECT AND WOULD BE A CLEAR SIGNAL TO SMITH THAT TIME HAD RUN OUT.

16. IN CLOSING, YOUNG SUGGESTED THAT PREM CHAND ASSEMBLE A TEAM OF ADVISORS FROM THE FRONT-LINE STATE IN ORDER TO INSTITUTIONALIZE COORDINATION WITH THOSE STATES. HE SUGGESTED, FOR EXAMPLE, MARK CHONE OF ZAMBIA AND BEN MKAPA OF TANZANIA AND FOREIGN MINISTER CHISSANO AND SPECIAL ASSISTANT VIEIRO FROM MOZAMBIQUE. PREM CHAND SAID THAT HE THOUGHT THE FRONT-LINE STATES NEED DO NOT MORE THAN CONTROL THE MILITARY SIDE OF THE HOUSE (I.E., THE GUERRILLAS). CONTROL OF THE GUERRILLAS AND THE SIMULTANEOUS REINING-IN OF THE RDF WOULD PROVIDE THE KEY OPENING FOR THE SUCCESSFUL INTRODUCTION OF A UN FORCE. YOUNG HOPED THAT PREM CHAND COULD BE REPORTING TO THE FRONT-LINE STATES AT LEAST EVERY TEN DAYS.

17. REGARDING POLICE FORCES, YOUNG SAID THAT POLITICALLY ALL THE BLACK LEADERS WERE OPPOSED TO THE POLICE FORCES BUT IN REALITY ALL OF THEM NEEDED THE CONFIDENTIAL

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POLICE. WHITE POLICE COMMANDERS WOULD BE SEEN AS MUCH LESS OF A THREAT TO INDIVIDUAL GUERRILLA LEADERS THAN WOULD COMMANDERS FROM RIVAL BLACK GROUPS. EVEN MUGABE WOULD NOT MIND THE PRESENCE OF SOME WHITE POLICE OR RDF ELEMENTS.

18. PERSONALLY, PREM CHAND APPEARED TOUGH, SMART AND CONFIDENT -- BUT WITH A REALISTIC APPRECIATION FOR THE PROBLEMS HE FACED. HE ASKED THE RIGHT QUESTIONS AND SEEMED OPEN-MINDED ON THE ANSWERS.

19. PREM CHAND SAID HE PLANS TO LEAVE NEW YORK FOR LONDON FRIDAY, OCTOBER 14. HE PLANS TO MEET WITH CARVER THE FOLLOWING MONDAY.
YOUNG

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Message Attributes

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